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PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER 
CORINNA BARRETT LAIN∗ 
My contribution to the 2013 Constitutional Law Schmooze poses a 
question about the downside of executive power, at least in the enforcement 
context.  If executive power to enforce the law presupposes the duty to use 
it,1 what happens when the executive branch would rather not? 
Perhaps reframing the question will help.  What do the death penalty, 
driving violations, drugs, deportation, and the Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”)2 have in common, besides the letter “d”?  The answer is 
passive-aggressive executive power, and in the brief discussion that 
follows, I use these five factual contexts to illustrate five variations of what 
I mean. 
When those charged with enforcing the law would prefer not to, what 
they do is not so different from what the rest of us do when pushed.  At 
least five passive-aggressive responses easily come to mind—and at the 
outset, I set aside the “Just say no” response, which is an exercise of 
executive power but is not in the passive-aggressive category (because it is 
just plain aggressive).3  Here are the five responses: (1) do nothing, and 
hope nobody notices; (2) do something silly, and make a mockery of the 
whole enterprise; (3) say that you would do something, but you are too 
busy; (4) say that you would do something, but you are not competent; and 
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 1.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 2.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub.L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. §§ 7 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)). 
 3.  See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 54 (1971) (“Eisenhower’s policy seemed to have been: ‘Thurgood 
Marshall got his decision, now let him enforce it.’”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, 
and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 131 (1994) (“Moreover, in 1956 Eisenhower on 
more than one occasion refused to involve the federal government when mob protests and state 
obstructionism blocked the implementation of school desegregation orders.”); see also ROBERT V. 
REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 216 (1988) (discussing President Jackson’s famous, but 
perhaps historically inaccurate, quote in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Worchester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!”). 
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(5) say, in a moment of rare clarity and self-awareness, “Fine, I’ll do it, but 
let’s just be clear—I don’t want to.”4 
In the discussion that follows, I first flush out these responses with my 
five examples—the death penalty, driving violations, drugs, deportation, 
and DOMA.  I then offer some normative thoughts about each of these 
responses using the standard of a reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old5 and 
parallel institutional considerations in the realm of executive power. 
I.  SAMPLING PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER 
A.  The Death Penalty 
In states that have the death penalty, the governor typically stands as 
the last stop between a condemned inmate and his or her death.6  In most 
states, this last stop takes the form of a clemency petition from the 
condemned inmate, but in some states, it takes the form of an application by 
the state for a death warrant instead.7  Either way, the state governor makes 
the call, wielding executive power to prevent executions (by commuting 
them to life sentences, granting pardons, and the like) or to order that 
executions be carried out (by issuing death warrants, denying clemency 
petitions, and the like).  The point is that state governors have to go one 
way or the other.  When petitions are on their desk, they have to decide—or 
do they? 
Consider Florida’s death penalty in 20118—a great example of the “do 
nothing, and hope nobody notices” strand of passive-aggressive executive 
power.  Florida has the second largest death row in the nation, with over 
four hundred condemned inmates awaiting execution.9  In April 2011, 
forty-seven of those inmates—slightly over ten percent—had exhausted all 
                                                          
 4.  This response is sometimes followed by “and I think it’s unfair.”   
 5.  I credit Julia Rose Lain for inspiring the analogy of a reasonably prudent 13-year-old, 
with thanks for refraining from many of the passive-aggressive responses I discuss in this essay. 
 6.  This assumes that all judicial remedies have been exhausted.  By governor, I mean 
governor or clemency board, also a part of the state executive branch.  
 7.  In Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, the governor must sign a death warrant to 
commence an execution.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.052; N.H. REV. STATE. ANN. § 630:5; 
Pennsylvania Readies First Non-Volunteer Execution Since 1978, Defendant Killed Sexual 
Abusers, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pennsylvania-readies-
first-non-volunteer-execution-1978-defendant-killed-sexual-abusers (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).  
 8.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.052 (effective July 4, 2000 through June 30, 2013). 
 9.  See Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2013) (showing 413 death row inmates in Florida as of January 1, 2013, compared to 
California’s 727 death row inmates). 
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appeals and were waiting for just one thing: the governor’s signature on 
their death warrant.10  Nearly twenty of Florida’s death row inmates have 
been awaiting execution for at least thirty years.11 
What’s the hitch?  Florida Governor Rick Scott had just started his 
term in January 2011,12 so although the press faulted him for the backlog,13 
he had little to do with it (as he has subsequently made clear by signing at 
least six death warrants since 2011).14  But Governor Charlie Crist, who 
preceded Governor Scott, had signed just six death warrants during his 
entire four-year term—a marked difference from the twenty-four death 
warrants that Governor Jeb Bush signed during his tenure as governor.15  
Indeed, under Governor Crist, more people on Florida’s death row died of 
natural causes than died of executions—around three times as many.16 
Why did Crist not sign more warrants?  The short answer (and key 
point, for the purposes of this discussion) is that he did not want to, but for 
those who want the longer version, a number of explanations come to mind.  
One blogger writing about Florida’s lag time on death row surmised, “Crist 
was running for U.S. Senate and didn’t want bad publicity in the press like 
Texas Governor Perry receives.”17  Other explanations may have been in 
                                                          
 10.  See Aaron Sharockman, Some 40 Death Row Inmates Awaiting Death Warrant from 
Governor, Democrat Claims, POLITIFACT.COM (Apr. 20, 2011, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2011/apr/20/geraldine-thompson/some-40-death-
row-inmates-awaiting-death-warrant-g/. 
 11.  See Douglas A. Berman, Just Why Are the “Waits” on Florida’s Death Row So Long?, 
SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 13, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/02/just-why-are-the-waits-on-floridas-death-row-so-long.html 
(noting that nineteen people on Florida’s death row had been waiting for execution longer than 
thirty-one years); Sharockman, supra note 10 (discussing the case of sixty-four-year-old death row 
inmate Gary Alvord, who had been awaiting execution for thirty-seven years).  
 12.  See List of Florida State Governors, THEUS50, http://www.theus50.com/ 
florida/governors.php. 
 13.  See Sharockman, supra note 10 (noting that, as of April 2011, Governor Scott “ha[d] yet 
to sign a death warrant since taking office”). 
 14.  Id.; Supreme Court Denies Last Appeal by Manuel Pardo.  Cop Turned Executioner 
Scheduled to Die Dec. 11, FLAGLERLIVE.COM (Dec. 6, 2012), http://flaglerlive.com/46202/ 
manuel-pardo-execution/; Scott Signs Death Warrant in the Killing of a Florida State Trooper, 
THELEDGER.COM, Jan. 19, 2013, http://www.theledger.com/article/20130119/NEWS/ 
130119263. 
 15.  Sharockman, supra note 10.  In fairness, Governor Jeb Bush served for two terms, so 
those twenty-four warrants were signed over eight years, not four.  See Jeb Bush, BIO. 
http://www.biography.com/people/jeb-bush-201294 (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).  Still, Governor 
Bush’s rate was twice that of Governor Crist’s rate (whether that is a good thing or bad is a 
different question).  See Sharockman, supra note 10. 
 16.  See Berman, supra note 11 (noting that only five people were actually executed under 
Governor Crist, while fifteen died of natural causes). 
 17.  See id. (describing the effect of bad publicity on political aspirations). 
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play as well.  The phenomenon of death row exonerations may have made 
Crist nervous; with twenty-four on record, Florida has the dubious 
distinction of having more exonerations than any other state.18  The 
prospect of triggering another round of post-conviction challenges might 
have curbed his enthusiasm too.19  It is also possible that the so-called 
“Marshall Hypothesis”20 was at work—as empirical evidence has shown, 
the more people know about the death penalty, the less they like it and more 
disturbing it becomes.21 
But who wanted to rush those executions anyway?  Not the inmates 
who were the subject of the pending death warrants, or the correctional 
officers responsible for carrying them out.22  One blogger questioned 
“whether anyone really cares all that much about how slow this march has 
come to be,”23 and the point is a valid one.  I am guessing victims care (at 
least some of them), and perhaps state attorneys general care too.  But there 
is no deadline for these sorts of petitions, and the process is notoriously 
secretive, so there is only so much anyone can do.24  That is why Florida’s 
death penalty under Governor Crist is a nice example of the “do nothing 
and hope nobody notices” strand of passive-aggressive executive power. 
Outside Florida, it is hard to say how many governors are taking a 
passive-aggressive approach to executions in their state.  Clearly not in this 
category is the governor of Texas, who has had no problem executing the 
                                                          
 18.  See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2013) 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty#inn-st (listing Florida’s death row 
exonerations as of December 26, 2012).  
 19.  See Berman, supra note 11 (“[Attorneys] file whatever they can for as long as they can to 
keep their cases alive in the courts.  New issues based on recent court rulings and changes in the 
law provide new fodder for appeals all the time . . . .”). 
 20.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 370 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Assuming 
knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen 
would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”).   
 21.  See, e.g., Austin Sarat and Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the 
Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171 (demonstrating 
empirical research in support of the Marshall Hypothesis). 
 22.  See, e.g., Law Enforcement Endorsements, SAFE CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.safecalifornia.org/about/law-enforcement-endorsements (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) 
(indicating one-hundred-fifty law enforcement endorsements to abolish the death penalty in 
California, including twenty-four correctional, parole, and probation officers). 
 23.  Berman, supra note 11.  
 24.  See Sarah Lundy, Only Florida’s Governors Can Say How They Pick Execution Order, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 19, 2009, http://www.fadp.org/news/2009052003/ (discussing secrecy 
and lack of accountability in death warrant process). 
 2013]        PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER 231 
law (or people).25  Also not in this category is Oregon’s governor, who, on 
the other side of the spectrum, has had no problem publicly denouncing the 
death penalty in his state and issuing reprieves.26  (Indeed, the latest from 
Oregon is a lawsuit over whether death row inmates can refuse to accept 
them.)27  But California may be in this category, as well as other 
nonexecuting states with people lingering on death row.28 
California has the largest death row in the country, with over seven 
hundred death row inmates awaiting execution.29  Like Florida, more of 
California’s death row inmates are dying from other causes than from 
executions.30  Of the ninety-eight people who have died on California’s 
death row in the modern death penalty era, thirteen died by execution, fifty-
eight by natural causes, twenty-two by suicide, and six by causes 
categorized as “other.”31  Although challenges to California’s lethal 
                                                          
 25.  With 502 executions since 1976, Texas is the clear leader among the states; Virginia is 
second highest with 110 executions.  See Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-
region-1976 (last visited July 26, 2013). 
 26.  Oregon’s governor is an example of the Marshall Hypothesis in action.  See supra notes 
20–21 and accompanying text (explaining Marshall Hypothesis).  Apparently, Governor John 
Kitzhaber was “haunted” by two executions during his first term of office, leading him to believe 
that Oregon’s death penalty is “‘compromised and inequitable.’”  Oregon Death Row Inmate 
Fighting Reprieve From Governor, FOXNEWS.COM, July 24, 2012, 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/24/oregon-death-row-inmate-fighting-reprieve-from-
governor/print [hereinafter Oregon Death Row Inmate]. 
 27.  See Oregon Death Row Inmate, supra note 26.  The death row inmate claimed that “[a] 
reprieve is not effective until accepted by the recipient” and that he wanted “to speed his 
punishment in protest of a criminal justice system that he says is broken.”  Id.  In the end, the 
judge ruled that the inmate had a right to reject the reprieve, while noting he agreed “with many of 
the concerns expressed by the governor.”  Lynne Terry, Gary Haugen Can Reject Gov. 
Kitzhaber’s Reprieve, Judge Rules, OREGONIAN, Aug. 3, 2012, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2012/08/ 
gary_haugen_can_reject_gov_kit.html.  
 28.  See Jurisdictions with No Recent Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/jurisdictions-no-recent-executions (last visited July 26, 2013) 
(showing twenty-six jurisdictions with no executions in the last ten years and thirty-three 
jurisdictions with no executions in the last five years).  It is important to note, however, that death 
row inmates may not be executed for a number of reasons, including mental health issues and new 
legal challenges based on changes in the law.  See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 9 (noting California’s 727 inmates on death 
row).  
 30.  Compare Jurisdictions with No Recent Executions, supra note 28, with Death Row 
Inmates by State, supra note 9. 
 31.  See Condemned Inmates Who Have Died Since 1978, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF 
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/ 
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injection protocol almost certainly account for the state’s lack of executions 
over the last several years,32 they do not account for the state’s lack of 
executions over the previous twenty. 
What we are seeing is the same basic phenomenon that Mark Graber 
wrote about in his path-breaking work on legislative deferrals.33  When 
legislators find it too costly to take a stand one way or the other, the stand 
they most prefer to take is no stand at all.34  Similarly, when chief 
executives do not want to say “yes” to executions, but cannot afford to say 
“no,” they do nothing and hope nobody notices.  It is the same basic 
response, but it is not legislative deferral—it is passive-aggressive 
executive power. 
B.  Driving Violations 
The example of driving violations is a tad off-point because it 
concerns a state’s passive-aggressive enforcement of a federal mandate, and 
thus is not purely an exercise of executive power (although executive power 
is a part of it).  But here is another beautiful example of a passive-
aggressive response to enforcement obligations, and it comes from personal 
experience so I had to use it.  Besides, this one is just quirky enough to be 
the sort of conversation starter one would hope for at an event called the 
“Schmooze.” 
When I was a kid growing up in Montana, my Dad used to put five-
dollar bills in the glove compartment box of our car.  I did not think about 
what that money was for, but when I became a teenager and had my driver 
license, I figured it out pretty quickly: it was to pay speeding tickets that 
during the daytime amounted to an on-the-spot five-dollar fine.  Crazy, 
right?  Here is the backstory. 
Before 1974, and for a brief period of time after 1995,35 Montana’s 
highway speed limit signs looked like this: 
                                                          
CONDEMNEDINMATESWHOHAVEDIEDSINCE1978.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  I 
presume that “other” includes various forms of homicide, such as being “shot on [detention 
facility] Exercise Yard.”  Id.   
 32.  For a discussion of California’s problems with lethal injection over the last several years, 
see Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking Small, 67 MIAMI L. REV. 397, 405 (2013). 
 33.  See generally Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to 
the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993) (discussing the inaccurate understandings of 
the relationship between independent judicial policymaking and the judiciary system). 
 34.  Id. at 53–61. 
 35.  In 1998, the Montana Supreme Court struck down the state’s “reasonable and prudent” 
speed limit as too vague to give drivers notice as to what was prohibited, violating the state’s due 
process clause.  See Montana v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Mont. 1998).  As one Montanan 
 












Outsiders called our roads the “Montanabahn,”37 but those of us who 
lived there knew it was mostly a matter of necessity—there were so many 
miles to cover, and so few cars, that most of the time it just did not make 
sense to drive slower than 80 to 90 miles per hour (“MPH”) on the 
highway.38 
Then the energy crisis hit, and in 1974, Congress passed the National 
Maximum Speed Law (“NMSL”), imposing a limit of 55 MPH across the 
country as a fuel conservation measure.39  (The national speed limit was 
later raised to 65 MPH, and then repealed entirely in 1995.40)  To coerce 
                                                          
tells it, “The case was brought by a plaintiff named Rudy Stanko, who was a well-known 
‘Freeman’ white-supremacist nut-job who was a perennial recreational litigant who finally hit a 
winner challenging the speed law.”  Montana Speeding Tickets: Did They Used to Have a Flat $5 
Rate and When Did It Change?, STRAIGHT DOPE (Apr. 20, 2008, 5:00 PM),  
http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=464693 [hereinafter Montana Speeding 
Tickets]. In 1999, the legislature set the speed limit at 65 MPH.  It was later bumped to the current 
75 MPH on interstates, 65 MPH on secondary roads. Montana Speed Limits, MDT, available at 
http://www.mdt.mt.gov/travinfo/speed_limit.shtml. 
 36.  Reasonable and Prudent . . . , MONTANA DAILY (Jan. 26, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.dailymontana.com/2011_01_01_archive.html.   
 37.  Montana Speed, U.S. HIGHWAYS, http://www.us-highways.com/montana/ 
mtspeed.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (discussing Montana’s reputation amongst speed 
enthusiasts as the “Montanabahn”).   
 38.  See Timothy Egan, Speeding Is Easy (and Almost Free) in Montana, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/10/us/speeding-is-easy-and-almost-free-in-
montana.html (“Trying to drive the speed limit here in the Big Sky State is like trying to eat 
nothing but bread crusts at a banquet.  There is just so much road and so few cars, that the 
temptation to put the pedal to the metal is overwhelming.”).  See also infra note 44. 
 39.  Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046 (1974) 
(codified in part at 23 U.S.C. § 658).  
 40.  Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 
Stat. 132 (1987) (raising speed limit on rural interstate highways to 65 MPH); National Highway 
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compliance, the NMSL threatened to withhold federal transportation dollars 
from states that did not play along.41  Montana played, but like other states, 
was not at all happy about it (remember that Sammy Hagar song, “I can’t 
drive 55!”?).42  “The only reason we’ve got any speed limit at all is Federal 
blackmail, pure and simple,” one Montanan told the press.43  Anyone who 
was anyone in Montana at the time knew about the NMSL—and hated it.44 
So what did Montana do?  It did something silly, making a mockery of 
the entire enterprise.  The whole point of the federal speed limit was energy 
conservation, so Montana decided to enforce the law with a five-dollar on-
the-spot fine for “waste of a natural resource.”45  Violations of the law did 
not go on a person’s driving record and could not be used to raise insurance 
rates.46  And because there was little point in issuing such tickets—it often 
took more gas to catch up with a speeding motorist than the ticket was 
worth—state troopers often did not write them (although I paid one, 
once).47 
                                                          
Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, 109 Stat. 568 (granting all speed limit control to the 
states). 
 41.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, A CHRONOLOGY OF DATES SIGNIFICANT IN THE 
BACKGROUND, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,  
http://ntl.bts.gov/historian/chronology.htm (last visited July 26, 2013) (“The act required that the 
Department [of Transportation] approve no highway projects for states having a maximum speed 
limit greater than 55 MPH.”); see also Egan, supra note 38 (“Only after Federal officials 
threatened to withhold highway funds did the state enact the $5 speeding ticket.”). 
 42.  For those who, sadly, are too young to have any idea what I am talking about, see Sammy 
Hagar Vevo, Sammy Hagar—I Can’t Drive 55, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RvV3nn_de2k. 
 43.  Egan, supra note 38.  
 44.  One blogger writes,  
The speed limit was treated with complete derision for a couple of reasons.  First, 
expecting people to drive 55 on most of the state highways and interstates in Montana 
is a joke.  These [roads] are mostly wide open, light traffic roads, and distances between 
towns is relatively far as compared to smaller states.  NOBODY drives 55.  Second, and 
more to the point, Montana has a bit of the ‘Live Free Or Die’ spirit (with apologies for 
stealing the motto of New Hampshire) and there was a lot of resentment that the Feds 
would strong-arm the state into passing a law that was (a) unnecessary and (b) 
unwanted. 
Montana Speeding Tickets, supra note 35; see also Egan, supra note 38 (“Few laws have ever 
been so despised . . . .”). 
 45.  See Egan, supra note 38 (“Officially, a $5 speeding ticket for violating the speed limit on 
Montana highways is not a moving violation, but ‘an unnecessary waste of a natural resource,’ 
gasoline.  Moreover, the ticket cannot be cited to increase insurance rates for motorists or become 
part of the permanent driving record.”). 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. (“Under this system, the state of Montana loses $22 in labor and processing costs for 
every ticket written by a state trooper, a recent study by a legislative committee found . . . .”  One 
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What Montana effectively said to the federal government with its five-
dollar on-the-spot penalty was, “Fine, we’ll enforce your silly law because 
we have to, but we’re not going to act like we mean it because we don’t.  
Read between the lines, here is what we think of your law.”  The federal 
government gave Montana a silly law, and Montana gave the federal 
government silly enforcement, making a mockery of the entire enterprise.  
That is why Montana’s enforcement of the NMSL is a nice example of the 
“do something silly” genre of passive-aggressive executive power. 
C.  Drugs (Specifically, Marijuana) 
Under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”),48 marijuana is 
categorized as a Schedule 1 drug (along with heroin and LSD) known for 
having a high potential for abuse and “no currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States.”49  As such, its cultivation, distribution, and 
possession are criminally punishable under federal law.50 
Enter the states.  Eighteen of them, as well as the District of Columbia, 
have decriminalized medical marijuana, which is marijuana purchased 
pursuant to a valid prescription and used for medicinal purposes.51  Another 
two states, Washington and Colorado, have now legalized the drug entirely 
in small amounts for recreational use.52 
Set aside the instinct to say that preemption doctrine resolves the 
conflict.  For complicated reasons that go beyond the scope of this Article, 
courts are not finding preemption.53  In practice, that means there are 
licensed businesses that are perfectly legitimate (and paying taxes) in 
                                                          
officer said, “See, I can sit here and write every car that goes by.  One day I wrote 63 tickets.  But 
with the Tinkertoy engine I’ve got in this car, it takes me five minutes just to catch up with the 
guy, and then I write a five-buck ticket.  Is that worth it?”). 
 48.  21 U.S.C. §§ 801 (2012). 
 49.  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012). 
 50.  Mere possession is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison and a minimum 
fine of $1,000.  See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012).  The cultivation and distribution of marijuana 
generally constitute felonies punishable by up to five years in prison and a maximum fine of 
$250,000.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012). 
 51.  See TODD GARVEY, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, 
AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 4 (Nov. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf. 
 52.  Id. at 4 n.22.  Both states have decriminalized the possession of small amounts of 
marijuana (typically less than an ounce).  Id.  
 53.  See id. at 7–14 (discussing the extent federal law preempts state medical marijuana laws).  
In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to pass the 
CSA, but did not address the preemption question that obviously followed.  Id. at 5–6. 
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twenty or so states, but that nevertheless are violating federal law.  What 
result? 
The answer has changed over time, so for the purposes of this 
discussion, I go back to 2008 and 2009.  In 2008, then-Senator Barack 
Obama was running for his first term as President.  When asked about his 
position on medical marijuana, he replied, “I’m not going to be using 
Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this 
issue.”54  White House drug czar Gil Kerlikowske followed with the sound 
bite, “We’re not at war with people in this country”55—and he was on to 
something.  Public opinion polls show that over seventy percent of those 
asked support the use of marijuana for medical purposes if prescribed by a 
doctor.56 
Once in office, President Obama’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) put 
its money where his mouth was.  In 2009, then-Deputy Attorney General 
David Ogden sent a memo to U.S. attorneys in states that authorized 
medical marijuana.57  Focusing on the “efficient and rational use of [DOJ’s] 
limited investigative and prosecutorial resources,” the memo told 
prosecutors that they “should not focus federal resources in [their] States on 
individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with 
existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”58  In a 
statement attached to the memo, Attorney General Eric Holder reiterated 
the point: “It will not be a priority to use federal resources to prosecute 
patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers who are complying with 
state laws on medical marijuana.”59  The plan, he told reporters in a 
question and answer session that followed, was “to go after those people 
who violate both federal and state law.”60 
                                                          
 54.  See Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  See Michael Scherer, What Is President Obama’s Problem with Medical Marijuana?, 
TIME (May 3, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/05/03/what-is-president-obamas-problem-
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 57.  Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys from David W. Ogden, Deputy 
Attorney General, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of 
Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-
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 58.  Id.  
 59.  David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States That Allow Medical 
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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 60.  AG Signals Shift in Medical Pot Policy, CBSNEWS.COM, Apr. 8, 2009, 
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In short, federal law was what it was, but enforcing this particular 
federal law was not a priority given DOJ’s limited resources and the myriad 
other things on its plate.  It was not that DOJ was refusing to enforce the 
law because of countervailing state positions and public opinion (as if it 
could).61  Nor was it the case that DOJ was telling its attorneys to simply 
“ignore federal drug laws” as some congressmen claimed.62  The point was 
that DOJ had limited resources and other, more important things to do.63  It 
would do something, but it was too busy. 
The story would not be complete without fast forwarding to 2011, 
when things really got interesting.  Hardliner Michele Leonhart was 
confirmed as head of the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), and shortly 
thereafter, the agency issued a position paper entitled, “The DEA Position 
on Marijuana” (with section headings like “The Fallacy of Marijuana for 
Medicinal Use,” one need not read all sixty-three pages to get the gist).64  
Within months, DOJ wrote another memo to federal prosecutors in medical 
marijuana states, this time stating, “Persons who are in the business of 
cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly 
facilitate such activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 
regardless of state law . . . such persons are subject to federal enforcement 
action, including potential prosecution.”65  A series of federal drug raids on 
state-licensed medical marijuana dispensaries soon followed, along with 
threats to prosecute those who owned, operated, or otherwise associated 
with them.66 
                                                          
 61.  See 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2012) (“[E]ach United States attorney, within his district, shall[] 
prosecute for all offenses against the United States . . . .”); see also supra note 1 (noting executive 
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 62.  See Stout & Moore, supra note 59 (noting that Representative Lamar Smith, senior 
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 64.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA (2011), available at 
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The state of affairs now is massive confusion.  While the Obama 
Administration maintains that its stance has been “clear and consistent” all 
along,67 White House drug czar Gil Kerikowske has recently acknowledged 
that the Administration “has not done a particularly good job” of 
articulating its drug policy,68 and legislators on both sides of the aisle have 
written an open letter calling upon the federal government to provide 
“clarity rather than chaos.”69  For his part, Attorney General Holder 
clarified DOJ’s position as follows: “If in fact people are not using the 
policy decision that we have made to use marijuana in a way that’s not 
consistent with the state statute, we will not use our limited resources in that 
way.”70  Um, yeah, that clears up a lot. 
Meanwhile, the uncertainty has started to play out in court.  In late 
2012, the City of Oakland filed suit against the federal government for 
seizing an Oakland building occupied by a registered and permitted medical 
marijuana dispensary,71 claiming in part that DOJ’s policy statements and 
prior pattern of nonenforcement against state-authorized dispensaries barred 
its seizure of the dispensaries under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.72  A 
federal magistrate recently dismissed the suit, but the same arguments are 
being made in the parallel forfeiture action.73  Meanwhile, over a dozen 
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Congressmen have since weighed in with a proposed federal statute to 
protect state medical marijuana dispensaries and the patients they serve.74 
Maybe what we are seeing is passive-aggressive enforcement of an 
earlier passive-aggressive decision not to enforce.  Regardless, DOJ’s 
earlier approach to (non)enforcement of the CSA in the context of medical 
marijuana exemplifies what we all do when we do not want to do 
something, but feel pushed to do it anyway—we say we would do it, but we 
are too busy with other more important things to do. 
D.  Deportation 
This next illustration of passive-aggressive executive power could be 
called deportation or “denying visas”—either way, it exemplifies the “I 
would, but I am not competent” approach to passive-aggressive executive 
power.  To see what I mean, one need only think back to the exclusion of 
homosexuals from the United States in the 1970s, and how a different 
government posture came to be.75   
Back in the 1950s and 1960s, Section 212 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act defined the class of aliens who were inadmissible to the 
United States as including “[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, 
sexual deviation, or a mental defect.”76  In 1967, the Supreme Court 
construed the phrase “psychopathic personality” in Section 212 to include 
homosexuals.77  Throughout most of the 1970s, the Immigration 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) enforced Section 212 by referring suspected 
homosexuals to an on-staff Public Health Service (“PHS”) official for a 
medical examination.78  The INS’s position was that a PHS medical 
certification was necessary because the determination of homosexuality was 
a matter beyond its expertise.79 
In 1979, the INS medical referral system came to an abrupt halt when 
the Surgeon General of the United States issued a policy memorandum 
stating that PHS medical officers would no longer certify homosexuality as 
                                                          
 74.  Id. 
 75.  I credit Peter Shane, with sincere thanks, for this wonderful contribution at the 
Schmooze. 
 76.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1970). 
 77.  Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) (“The legislative history of the Act indicates 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to 
include homosexuals such as petitioner.”).  
 78.  Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (1983). 
 79.  Id. at 1477–78 (reviewing INS’s rationale for requiring medical certification). 
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a mental disease or defect per se.80  According to the memo, the policy 
change was made for two reasons.  First, the American Psychiatric 
Association’s DSM II and forthcoming DSM III (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) no longer included homosexuality as a 
psychiatric disorder.81  Second, homosexuality was not a determination that 
could be made by a routine medical exam.82  The Surgeon General’s 
position was that just as INS had declared itself not competent to make 
determinations of homosexuality, the PHS was not competent either.83 
With no one claiming the competency to make a determination of 
homosexuality, Section 212’s bar against homosexual aliens eventually 
took care of itself.  The INS first allowed suspected homosexuals to enter 
the United States conditionally, deferring action on their case for the 
duration of their visit84 (which, by the way, presents another nice example 
of the “do nothing, and hope nobody notices” approach discussed above).85  
The INS then adopted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that essentially 
ignored the prohibition entirely unless an alien made an unambiguous 
admission of homosexuality on his or her own.86  When that eventuality 
finally occurred, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that INS was 
unable to enforce Section 212 given the certification procedure on the 
books.87  In the concluding lines of its opinion, the court wrote: 
Because the PHS refuses to issue medical certificates on the basis 
of homosexuality per se and because we today hold that the INS 
may not exclude homosexual aliens without such certificates, it is 
completely speculative that any aliens will be excluded in the 
future on the basis of their homosexuality per se.88 
And with that, the provision was declared dead. 
                                                          
 80.  Id. at 1472. 
 81.  Id. at 1472 n.3 (citation omitted). 
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Eventually, Section 212 was amended to formally end the exclusion of 
suspected homosexuals on that basis (although not until 1990).89  Yet even 
while it was valid, both the INS and PHS rendered Section 212 a nullity by 
taking the same approach to its dictates—“I would, but I’m not competent.  
You will need to get somebody else.” 
E.  DOMA 
The Obama Administration’s stance on the now invalid Section 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)90 is such a clear-cut example of 
passive-aggressive executive power that I can get right to the point.  Section 
3 of DOMA codified the definition of marriage for all federal purposes as 
“only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife.”91  Thus, same-sex couples were not eligible for a host of federal 
benefits, such as filing joint tax returns, collecting Social Security 
survivors’ benefits, and qualifying for insurance coverage as the spouse of a 
government employee.92 
President Obama had long opposed DOMA in principle, and in 
February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to Congress 
stating that both he and the President had concluded that Section 3 violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.93  As such, the letter 
explained, the executive branch would no longer defend DOMA in cases 
where its constitutionality was being decided against a blank slate (although 
it would continue to defend the statute in other cases and, in any event, 
would continue to enforce its provisions until Congress repealed them or 
the judicial branch ruled them invalid).94  Attorney General Holder also 
pledged to “notify the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full and 
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fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those cases,”95 and indeed, 
House Republicans hired a lawyer to defend the moribund statute on their 
own.96 
In a roundtable discussion with reporters, President Obama explained 
the rationale behind his approach, stating: 
Administratively, we can’t ignore the law.  DOMA is still on the 
books.  What we have said is even as we enforce it, we don’t 
support it, we think it’s unconstitutional.  The position that my 
administration has taken I think will have a significant influence 
on the court as it examines the constitutionality of this law.97 
As the nation’s chief executive, President Obama felt that he had to 
enforce DOMA.  But he clearly did not want to, and he did not see his 
obligation as defending the law as well (at least when he thought it to be 
unconstitutional).  Indeed, President Obama explicitly recognized his 
refusal to defend DOMA as a way to undermine it—a way to signal to 
courts in no uncertain terms just how indefensible the Administration 
thought the law was.98  Critics called the move “an executive power 
grab,”99 but there is another (and in my mind better) name for the approach 
President Obama took: passive-aggressive executive power. 
II.  EVALUATING PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER 
One might evaluate executive power from a number of different 
vantage points, and plenty of law review articles have.100  The focus of my 
discussion, however, has been passive-aggressive executive power, so that 
is the evaluative lens I use here.  Assuming, again, that executive power to 
enforce the law includes the duty to use it (so the “Just say no” option is not 
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on the table), how do the passive-aggressive responses discussed above 
compare? 
I start the discussion with a thought experiment: rather than talking 
about executive power, what insights might we glean if we couched the 
discussion in terms of a reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old instead?  
Executive power is complicated, but passive-aggressive responses exist in 
some pretty simple forms, and kids are a nice example.  Parents impose 
upon their children all sorts of obligations to do things that their children 
would prefer not to do.101  For the most part (and assuming away the 
terrible twos), our children do not come right out and say “no” to those 
directives.  They do other things—passive-aggressive things—instead, and 
they have those responses down pat by the time they are in their early teens.  
So applying the standard of a reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old, how do 
the responses I have discussed above fare? 
First consider the “do nothing, and hope nobody notices” response.102  
What parent on this planet is okay with that?  None that I know, and the 
reason is not so much that the behavior is passive-aggressive, but rather 
because there is a good chance it would work (that is, nobody would 
notice—that is, until disaster struck).  Parents are busy people.  We simply 
don’t have time to monitor every move our thirteen-year-olds make.  That is 
why when we tell them to do something, we have to have some modicum of 
trust that they will actually do it, if only so that we can get on with the 
myriad of other things competing for our precious time. 
Second, what about the “do something silly” response, the one that 
makes a mockery of the entire enterprise?103  This one is no better, and in 
many ways worse.  It is the one response that infuriates us as parents 
because it is all about flouting our power.  This one feels disrespectful 
because it is disrespectful, and nobody likes being disrespected—least of 
all, parents. 
Third is the “I would, but I’m too busy” response—the blow-off.104  
When it is a legitimate excuse (for example, a school project is due), then 
we understand, we bend.  But when what is really going on is passive-
aggressive behavior, then our response tends to be more along the lines of 
“Busy?  I’ll show you busy” (sometimes accompanied by “and don’t you 
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give me that look”).  Here again, the response feels disrespectful because it 
is disrespectful—and when it comes to the blow-off, there is another danger 
as well.  In the parenting world, consistency is everything.  The response 
we get depends on the signals we send, and if we sometimes demand that 
our child do a particular task and at other times don’t, our reasonably 
prudent thirteen-year-old will get the signal that the task is not all that 
important.  We cannot get mad at our hypothetical thirteen-year-old for not 
emptying the dishwasher when we have been inconsistent about insisting 
that she do it in the past. 
Fourth, the closely related “I would, but I am not competent” 
response105 is an empirically proven husband avoidance technique 
(particularly in the realm of laundry and dishes), but one can imagine our 
reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old being a quick study and trying it out as 
well.  Here we are dealing with a possible blow-off and a moral hazard 
problem as well—why learn how to perform certain tasks when not 
knowing how to perform them is the ticket out?  This one is no better than 
the rest, and given the adverse incentives in play, it may be worse. 
That leaves only the “Fine I’ll do it but let’s be clear, I don’t want to” 
response—and now we are on to something.106  This approach is the one we 
parents do not mind.  After all, how many times have we praised our kids 
for “using their words” rather than acting out?  In the grand scheme of 
things, I cannot make my thirteen-year-old want to do what I have told her 
to do.  But if her resistance takes the form of “Fine, I’ll do it, but for the 
record, I don’t want to,” that is about as good as it is going to get.  It 
respects my authority.  It allows for self-expression.  And it paves the way 
for dialogue rather than ignorance, confusion, or anger—which is what I am 
left with as a result of the other passive-aggressive responses.  For the 
record, that is an incredibly mature thing for a thirteen-year-old (even a 
reasonably prudent one) to do. 
Turning now to the realm of executive power, I submit that the 
institutional considerations one might employ to evaluate the various 
passive-aggressive responses to enforcement obligations are not so different 
from these.  We do not want the executive branch to do nothing and hope 
nobody notices.  People are busy living their lives; they do not have time to 
enforce the enforcers.  We also do not want executive power being used in 
ways that make a mockery of our laws.  The thumb-your-nose response to 
enforcement obligations is not exactly a healthy way of managing inter-
branch conflict or complex institutional dynamics.  The “I would, but I’m 
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too busy” blow-off is not much better, and in some ways is worse.  It not 
only shirks executive branch duties, but also sends inconsistent signals 
about where, when, and how laws will be enforced—with unfair results, as 
the medical marijuana context amply shows.  And the “I would, but I am 
not competent” response is deeply problematic for all the same reasons, and 
comes with a moral hazard problem to boot. 
Only the last strand of passive-aggressive executive power—the “I’ll 
do it but I do not want to” response—presents an arguably acceptable 
approach to unwanted executive power.  It does not shirk enforcement 
obligations, but it does let the other branches know exactly where the 
executive stands.  It is the executive branch “using its words,” paving the 
way for an inter-branch dialogue that might just obviate the need for further 
displays of passive-aggressive executive power.  And for the record, that is 
an incredibly mature thing for an executive branch (even a reasonably 
prudent one) to do. 
 
 
